Zachman+Framework+Complete+overview+of+IT+business+alignment.jpg' alt='Iso 7498 2 Security Architecture Frameworks' title='Iso 7498 2 Security Architecture Frameworks' />Transportation systems are very important in modern life therefore, massive research efforts has been devoted to this field of study in the recent past. Effective. NonISO information security standards and methods Australian Government Information Security Manual. The unclassified version is available on the web. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 Wikipedia. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48. Automatic Identification and Data Capture Techniques Data Structures Digital Signature Meta Structure is an international standard specification under development by ISOIEC JTC1 SC3. ISOIEC 20248 Automatic Identification and Data Capture Techniques Data Structures Digital Signature Meta Structure is an international standard specification. ISO 1 ISO 99. ISO 12016 Geometrical product specifications GPS Standard reference temperature for the specification of geometrical and dimensional properties. Retrouvez toutes les discothque Marseille et se retrouver dans les plus grandes soires en discothque Marseille. Cyber security has gained attention in large part because we are constantly surprised by the pervasive nature, persistence, diversity, and consequences of attacks. This document is a glossary of Web services terms defined and used in the Web Services Architecture WS Arch. It is intended for use by Web services spefications in. WG2. This development is an extension of SANS 1. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 and SANS 1. SANS 1. 36. 8 is a South African national standard developed by the South African Bureau of Standards. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 and SANS 1. RFID tag is structured and digitally signed. The purpose of the standard is to provide an open and interoperable method, between services and data carriers, to verify data originality and data integrity in an offlineuse case. Itut. 20083,000itutitutpdf. The ISOIEC 2. 02. Dig. Sig which refers to a small, in bit count, digital signature. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 also provides an effective and interoperable method to exchange data messages in the Internet of Things Io. T and machine to machine M2. M services allowing intelligent agents in such services to authenticate data messages and detect data tampering. DescriptioneditISOIEC 2. X. 5. 09 application specification similar to SMIME. Classic digital signatures are typically too big the digital signature size is typically more than 2k bits to fit in barcodes and RFID tags while maintaining the desired read performance. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 digital signatures, including the data, are typically smaller than 5. X. 5. 09 digital certificates within a public key infrastructure PKI is used for key and data description distribution. This method ensures the open verifiable decoding of data stored in a barcode andor RFID tag into a tagged data structure for example JSON and XML. ISOIEC 2. 02. 48 addresses the need to verify the integrity of physical documents and objects. The standard counters verification costs of online services and device to server malware attacks by providing a method for multi device and offline verification of the data structure. Examples documents and objects are education and medical certificates, tax and sharestock certificates, licences, permits, contracts, tickets, cheques, border documents, birthdeathidentity documents, vehicle registration plates, art, wine, gemstones and medicine. A Dig. Sig stored in a QR code or near field communications NFC RFID tag can easily be read and verified using a smartphone with an ISOIEC 2. The application only need to go online once to obtain the appropriate Dig. Sig certificate, where after it can offline verify all Dig. Sigs generated with that Dig. Sig certificate. A Dig. Sig stored in a barcode can be copied without influencing the data verification. For example a birth or school certificate containing a Dig. Sig barcode can be copied. The copied document can also be verified to contain the correct information and the issuer of the information. A Dig. Sig barcode provides a method to detect tampering with the data. A Dig. Sig stored in an RFIDNFC tag provides for the detection of copied and tampered data, therefore it can be used to detect the original document or object. The unique identifier of the RFID tag is used for this purpose. The Dig. Sig EnvelopeeditISOIEC 2. Dig. Sig envelope. The Dig. Sig envelope structure contains the Dig. Sig certificate identifier, the digital signature and the timestamp. Fields can be contained in a Dig. Sig envelope in 3 ways Consider the envelope Dig. Siga, b, c which contains field sets a, b and c. Dig. Sig envelope. All the information the signed field value and the field value is stored on the AIDC is available to verify when the data structure is read from the AIDC barcode andor RFID. NOT included in the Dig. Sig envelope only the signed field value is stored on the AIDC. Therefor the value of a b field must be collected by the verifier before verification can be performed. This is useful to link a physical object with an barcode andor RFID tag to be used as an anti counterfeiting measure for example the seal number of a bottle of wine may be a b field. The verifier needs to enter the seal number for a successful verification since it is not stored in the barcode on the bottle. When the seal is broken the seal number may also be destroyed and yielded unreadable the verification can therefore not take place since it requires the seal number. A replacement seal must display the same seal number using holograms and other techniques may make the generation of a new copied seal number not viable. Similarly the unique tag ID, also known is the TID in ISOIEC 1. In this case the TID is a b field. The interrogator will read the Dig. Wii Console Skin Template Secondlife. Sig envelope from the changeable tag memory and then read the non changeable unique TID to allow for the verification. If the data was copied from one tag to another, then the verification process of the signed TID, as stored in the Dig. Sig envelope, will reject the TID of the copied tag. NOT signed but included in the Dig. Sig envelope only the field value is stored on the AIDC. A c field can therefore NOT be verified, but extracted from the AIDC. This field value may be changed without affecting the integrity of the signed fields. The Dig. Sig Data PatheditTypically data stored in a Dig. Sig originate as structured data JSON or XML. The structured data field names maps directly on the Dig. Sig Data Description DDD. This allows the Dig. Sig Generator to digitally sign the data, store it in the Dig. Sig envelope and compact the Dig. Sig envelope to fit in the smallest bits size possible. The Dig. Sig envelope is then programmed in an RFID tag or printed within a barcode symbology. The Dig. Sig Verifier reads the Dig. Sig envelope from the barcode or RFID tag. It then identifies the relevant Dig. Sig certificate, which it uses to extract the fields from the Dig. Sig envelope and obtain the external fields. The Verifier then performs the verification and makes the fields available as structured data for example JSON or XML. ExampleseditQR exampleeditThe following education certificate examples use the URI RAW Dig. Sig envelope format. The URI format allows a generic barcode reader to read the Dig. Sig where after it can be verified online using the URI of the trusted issuer of the Dig. Sig. Often the ISOIEC 2. App will be available on this website for down load, where after the Dig. Sig can be verified offline. Note, a compliant App must be able to verify Dig. Sigs from any trusted Dig. Sig issuer. The university certificate example illustrates the multi language support of SANS 1. University certificate example. RFID and QR ExampleeditIn this example a vehicle registration plate is fitted with an ISOIEC 1. Type 6. C RFID tag and printed with a QR barcode. The plate is both offline verifiable using a smartphone, when the vehicle is stopped or using an RFID reader, when the vehicle drive past the reader. Note the 3 Dig. Sig Envelope formats RAW, URI RAW and URI TEXT. The Dig. Sig stored in the RFID tag is typically in a RAW envelope format to reduce the size from the URI envelope format. Barcodes will typically use the URI RAW format to allow generic barcode readers to perform an online verification. The RAW format is the most compact but it can only be verified with a SANS 1. The Dig. Sig stored in the RFID tag will also contain the TID Unique Tag Identifier within the signature part. A Dig. Sig Verifier will therefore be able to detect data copied onto another tag. QR with External data exampleeditSANS1. QR Equipment Permit with PINThe following QR barcode is attached to a computer or smartphone to prove it belongs to a specific person. It uses a b type field, described above, to contain a secure personal identification number PIN remembered by the owner of the device. The Dig. Sig Verifier will ask for the PIN to be entered, before the verification can take place. The verification will be negative if the PIN is incorrect. The PIN for the example is 1. The Dig. Sig Data Description for the above Dig. Sig is as follows def. Management. Fields mediasize 5. ZAR. DAURI https www.